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Abstract
This paper proposes to use the entailment that is a logical
connective in entailment logic and relevance logics as a logical basis
for deductive reasoning. The proposal is based on two ideas
concerning the use of logic in computer science. One is that logic
should be regarded as a description tool to represent an entailment
relation between propositions. The other is that logic should be
regarded as a reasoning tool to guarantee a logical validity of
deductive reasoning in the sense of the entailment, $i.e.$ , the
conclusion of a valid deductive reasoning should not be a tautological
consequence but an entailment consequence for given premises.
Using the entailment as a logical basis for deductive reasoning
makes it possible for us to construct such logic systems where the
validity of a conclusion of a deductive reasoning is dependent only on
the validity of given premises and the correctness of the reasoning
and independent of the concrete content of the conclusion.
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In recent years, various deductive reasoning methods have extensively been
used in many areas of computer science, both in theoretical researches and in
practical applications, such as logic programming systems, deductive
databases, expert systems, and knowledge-based systems. Many of them are
fundamentally based on the classical nathematical logic where the modus
ponens with the material implication is used as a logical basis for deductive
reasoning. The modus ponens has such a form: from X and $Xarrow Y$ to infer $Y$
where X and $Y$ are logical formulas and $arrow$ is the material implication$\cdot$.
Logic deals with what follows from what. It is the systematic study of the
fundamental principles that underlie correct, necessary pieces of reasoning, as
these occur in proofs, arguments, inferences, and deductions. The correctness of
a piece of reasoning does not depend on what the reasoning is about so much as
on how the reasoning is done; on the pattern of relationship between the
various constituent ideas rather than on the actual ideas themselves. To get at
the relevant aspects of such reasoning, logic must abstract its form from its
content. A basic idea of logic is regarding a deductive reasoning form is valid if
there is no reasoning of that form whose premisses are true and whose
conclusion is false without regard for the concrete contents of the premisses and
conclusion [Robinson-79].
The classical mathematical logic is the study of logic as a mathematical
theory. Its function is to provide formal languages for describing the structures
with which mathematicians work, and the methods of proof available to them.
Mathematicians construct mathematical logic as a mathematical model of the
systems to be studied, and then conduct what is essentially a pure
mathenatical investigation of the properties of this model. Therefore, An
important feature of the classical mathematical logic is that it need not concern
the nature of the real world in the sense that the world mathematicians study is
the purely conceptual one of pure mathematics [Kleene-67, Barnes-75,
Johnstone-87].
On the other hand, it is clear that computer science, both its theoretical
aspect and its practical aspect, is not purely nathematical. According to ISO
Standard 2382/1 (1984), computer science is “the branch of science and
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technology that is concerned with methods and techniques relating to data
processing performed by automatic means“. Today, the word “data processing”
has included, in a broad sense, the meaning of processing “information“ and
“knowledge” which are closely concerned with the nature of our real world.
Any problem or project on which computer scientists or engineers work is
certainly concerned with processing information $and/or$ knowledge. Therefore,
we may and should require that use of logic in computer science, especially in
deductive reasoning, is consistent with our ordinary logical thinking. In fact,
logic is extensively used in computer science precisely because it is ordinarily
used by us with a natural language forn just as a basic tool in presentation and
analysis of arguments.
However, from the viewpoint of our ordinary logical thinking, there is a
theoretical problem in using the material implication as a logical basis for
deductive reasoning. That is, some formulas, such as $Xarrow(Yarrow X)$ and
“ $\neg Xarrow(Xarrow Y)$ which may be axioms or provable formal theorems in the
classical mathematical logic, are regarded as “implicational paradoxes“ in the
sense of our ordinary logical thinking. As a result, for a conclusion of such a
deductive reasoning, we cannot directly accept it as a “valid” conclusion in the
sense of our ordinary logical thinking, even if each of given premises is “valid”
in the sense of our ordinary logical thinking. In order to evaluate whether the
conclusion is valid, we have to investigate the concrete content of the
conclusion.
We consider the use of logic in computer science should be based on such a
logical basis as is consistent with our ordinary logical thinking. A basic
requirement for a software system working with a deductive reasoning
mechanism should be that it is possible for users to directly accept a deductively
reasoned conclusion as a “valid” conclusion in the sense of our ordinary logical
thinking if each of given premises is “valid”. This paper proposes to use the
entailment that is a logical connective in entailment logic and relevance logics
as a logical basis for deductive reasoning. The proposal is based on two ideas
concerning the use of logic in computer science. One is that logic should be
regarded as a description tool to represent an entailment relation between
propositions. The other is that logic should be regarded as a reasoning tool to
guarantee a logical validity of deductive reasoning in the sense of the
entailment, i.e., the conclusion of a valid deductive reasoning should not be a
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tautological consequence but should be an entailment consequence for g\’iven
premises.
In Section 2, we point out some problems in using the material implication as
a logical basis for deductive reasoning. In Section 3, we review briefly
relevance logics [Anderson-75] and entailment logic [Lin-85a,b]. In Section 4,
we summarize propositional aspect of entailment logic. In Section 5, we present
a formal semantics for a subclass of propositional entailment logic. In Section
6, we discuss the problem of validity of deductive reasoning. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 7.
2. Problems ofUsing the Material Inplication as a Logical Basi$s$
for Deductive Reasoning
In our ordinary logical thinking, the notion of entailment, which is often
informally said “entails” or if $\cdots$ then”, plays a central role. The entailment
relation between two propositions, for instance, “X entails $Y$’ or “if X then $Y’$ ,
depends not only on the truth of X and $Y$ but also more essentially on a
necessarily relevant relation between X and Y. On the other hand, in the
classical mathematical logic, the material implication relation between two
propositions depends only on the truth of X and $Y$ and is independent of any
necessarily relevant relation between X and Y. There is no problem if one use
the material implication accurately and strictly according to its formal truth
functional interpretation, as mathematical logicians do. But unfortunately,
many people often use the material implication with an informal interpretation
of the entailnent notion, e.g., if $\cdots$ then”, and even some texts suggest such use
to readers. This brings about the problem of implicational paradoxes.
For example, $parrow(qarrow p)$ , which is generally as an axiom in the classical
mathematical logic, is equivalent to $qarrow(\neg p\vee P))$ . In terms of the logic, this
means that “a identically true proposition is implied by any proposition”.
$\neg parrow(parrow q)$ , which is a provable formal theorem in the logic, is equivalent to
$(\neg p\wedge p)arrow q$ . This means that “a identically false proposition implies any
proposition”. However, in the sense of our ordinary logical thinking, we can
accept neither proposition “if $p$ then $t$ for a identically true proposition $t$ and
any proposition $p$ ’ nor proposition “if $f$ then $p$ for a identically false proposition $f$
and any proposition $p$ ’ as a “valid” proposition.
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Due to the problem of implicational paradoxes, when using the material
implication as a logical basis for deductive reasoning, we may confront with the
following dilemma. On the one hand, if we use the material implication
accurately and strictly according to its formal truth functional interpretation,
then a material implication proposition, e.g., “if snow is black then $3+4=7$’ or
“if snow is white then $3+4=7’$ , each of which is “invalid“ in the sense of our
ordinary logical thinking, can be accepted as a valid proposition used in a
deductive reasoning. On the other hand, if we use the material implication
with an if $\cdots$ then” interpretation of the entailment, then we cannot expect to
obtain a “valid” conclusion with respect to entailment between two
propositions, e.g., “if X then $Y’$ , from a deductive reasoning even if each of
given premises is ”valid” in the sense of our ordinary logical thinking. The
classical mathematical logic does not provide such a guarantee.
Therefore, in the framework of the classical mathematical logic, for a
deductively reasoned conclusion, we cannot directly accept it as a valid
conclusion in the sense of our ordinary logical thinking even if each of given
premises is “valid” in the sense of our ordinary logical thinking. In order to
evaluate whether the conclusion is valid, we have to investigate the concrete
content of the conclusion. This is inconsistent with the basic idea of logic that
the validity of a conclusion of a reasoning should be dependent only on the
validity of given premises and the correctness of the reasoning and independent
of the concrete content of the conclusion. If the validity of a conclusion reasoned
by a software system has to be evaluated based on the investigation of the
concrete content of the conclusion, then this is just as the correctness of codes
generated by a compiler has to be guaranteed by checking the codes by users
themselves !
The cause of the problem of implicational paradoxes is that the material
implication notion is intrinsically different from the entailment notion of
human ordinary logical thinking in senantics. Therefore, there is a key
question. Can we have a logical connective whose meaning is consistent with
the entailment notion of human ordinary logical thinking and has a formal
interpretation? In order to construct more “natural” $and/or$ “logical” deductive
reasoning mechanism, we have to answer this $prob_{\wedge}^{1}em$ .
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3. Relevance logics and Entailment Logic
An obvious strategy for solving the problem of implicational paradoxes in the
classical mathematical logic is to formalize the notion of ”entailment” as a
relation stronger than the notion of “material implication” such that all
implicational paradoxes are unprovable in an axiom system based on the
formalization. Based on this idea, a number of “paradox-free” logics have been
proposed. However, “the simple avoidance of paradox is hardly sufficient to
characterize what we mean by entailment, and most of the formalized proposals
based on this single aim have been so artificial as to make it virtually
impossible to get a clear grasp of their formal properties” [Anderson-60].
The first interesting proposal for “paradox-free” logics is Ackermann’s logic
system which provably avoids the implicational paradoxes [Ackermann-56].
Ackermann introduced a new logical connective called ”strenge
implikation(rigorous implication)”, which provides a strong and natural sort of
implication relation, and construct a calculus $\Pi$ of “strenge implikation”.
Unlike the previous proposals, “Ackermann’s system, which has the required
property, seems intuitively natural, and strong enough to be of interest”
[Anderson-57]. However, Ackermann has not given a semantical definition for
his rigorous implication and a formal model for his calculus $\Pi$ of “strenge
implikation“. Anderson and Belnap modified and reconstructed Ackermann’s
system into an equivalent logic system, called “system $E$ of entailment”
[Anderson-58,60,751. They also interested $E’ s$ some neighboring logic systems
which are obtained by adding (dropping) some axioms into (from) system $E$
[Anderson-75]. These logic systems are generally called “relevance logics”
[Anderson-75, Morgan-76, Routley-84, Thistlewaite-88].
Lin’s “entailment logic” [Lin-85a,b] is another interesting proposal which is
independent of the work of Ackermann et al. Lin investigated logical meaning
of the sufficient conditional relation in human ordinary logical thinking and
introduced a new logical connective, called ”entailment”, as a logical
abstraction of the sufficient conditional relation. He proposed two new logical
concepts, i.e., the first independence in the entailment relation between two
propositions and the second independence in a deductive inference. He also
constructed a propositional calculus, denoted by $Cm$ , which provably avoids the
implicational paradoxes, and a notional calculus, denoted by $Cn$ , with $Cm$ as
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the underlying propositional logic. However, Lin has not given a formal model
for his entailment logic system.
The above studies by philosophers $and/or$ logicians are presented in the
philosophical literature. However, such studies has received little attention
from conputer scientists [Morgan-76, Thistlewaite-88].
We compare the main deference between the relevance logics and the
entailment logic in their three aspects, i.e., claim, syntax, and semantics. Both
constructors of the relevance logics and the entailment logic claim that one
should take the heart of logic to lie in the notion of entailment [Anderson-75,
Lin-85a]. But, the constructors of relevance logics regard the relevance logics
as a branch of mathematical logic [Anderson-75] and the constructor of
entailment logic rejects mathematical logic and regard the entailment logic as
a modern development of classical formal logic [Lin-85a]. Therefore, the
approach of Ackermann et al is “syntactical” or “proof-theoretical”, i.e., they
investigate syntactic features of the implicational paradoxes and constructs
formal axiom systems which provably avoids the paradoxes at first and then
investigate formal semantics for the axiom systems. On the other hand, Lin’s
approach is “semi-semantical” or “semi-model-theoretical”, i.e., he investigate
logical meaning of the notion of entailment in human ordinary logical thinking
and introduced a new logical connective as a logical abstraction of the
entailment at first and then construct the propositional calculus and the
notional calculus for the entailment. From a syntactical view point, a
propositional entailment logic can be regarded as a relevance logic because it
can be obtained by dropping some axioms from system $E$ and adding some
axioms. A complete entailment logic is a notional logic and includes no
quantifiers. But there are no notional calculus of the relevance logics. The
main difference between the relevance logics and the entailment logic in
semantics is that Lin first explicitly introduced the concepts of the first
independence and the second independence in constructing entailment logic.
Based on these concepts, Lin successfully solved the failure problem of
disjunctive syllogism [Hughes-72, Thistlewaite-88, Lin-85a].
We consider the concepts of the first independence and the second
independence are important for discussing the validity of a deductive
reasoning. Therefore, below we will investigate what is a valid deductive
reasoning based on Lin’s entailment logic.
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4. Propositional Entailment Logic
A formal axiom system for the propositional entailment logic, denoted by $Cm$
[Lin-85a,b], is summarized as follows, where X, $Y$ , and $Z$ are syntactical
variables.
Alphabet:
(1) a denumerable set ofproposition variable symbols;




(1) every proposition variable, also called atomic formula, is a formula;
(2) if X and $Y$ are formulas then $\neg X,$ $(X\wedge Y),$ $(X\Rightarrow Y)$ are formulas, where
the outermost brackets of a formula can be omitted;
(3) only those defined by (1) and (2) are formulas.
Axiom Schemata:
$A_{1}$ $X\Rightarrow\neg\neg X$
$A_{2}$ $(X\Rightarrow(Y\Rightarrow Z))\Rightarrow(Y\Rightarrow(X\Rightarrow Z))$
$A_{3}$ $(Y\Rightarrow Z)\Rightarrow((X\Rightarrow Y)\Rightarrow(X\Rightarrow Z))$
A4 $(\neg X\Rightarrow Y)\Rightarrow(\neg Y\Rightarrow X)$
$A_{5}$ $(X\wedge\neg Y)\Rightarrow\neg(X\Rightarrow Y)$
$A_{6}$ $X\Rightarrow(X\wedge X)$
$A_{7}$ $(X\wedge Y)\Rightarrow X$
$A_{8}$ $(X\wedge Y)\Rightarrow(Y\wedge X)$
$A_{9}$ $((X\Rightarrow Y)\wedge(X\Rightarrow Z))\Rightarrow(X\Rightarrow(Y\wedge Z))$
$A_{10}$ $((X\wedge\neg(\neg Y\wedge\neg Z))\Rightarrow\neg(\neg(X\wedge Y)\wedge\neg(X\wedge Z)))$
Inference Rules:
$R_{1}$ From X and $X\Rightarrow Y$ to infer $Y$
$R_{2}$ From X and $Y$ to infer XAY




$\neg X$ : “Xdoes not hold”
$X\wedge Y$ : “Both X and $Y$ hold“
$X\Rightarrow Y$ : ) “It can be determined that there is no such case as X holds and $Y$
does not hold with neither determining whether X holds or not nor
determining whether $Y$ holds or not”
The entailment $\Rightarrow$ requires that every entailment formula satisfies the
following two conditions in semantics:
(1) there is no such case as the antecedent is true and the consequent is false;
(2) condition (1) can be determined with neither determining whether
antecedent is true or false nor determining consequent is true or false.
The above condition (2) is called first independence [Lin-85a,b]. The most
intrinsic difference between the entailment and the material implication is
that the former has the first independence which is a requirement for a
necessary relevant relation between two propositions but the latter does not
have such requirement.
There may be two possible extensions with $Cm$ as the underlying
propositional logic. One is to extend $Cm$ into a notional logic ILin-85a,b]. The
other is to extend $Cm$ into a first order logic.
Now, we give some definitions for future discussion.
Definition 4.1 We call a formula a classical formula if no entailment
connective occurs in it. We use $C_{c}$ to denote the set of all classical formulas. We
call a formula with form $X^{o}\Rightarrow Y$ an entailment formula, where X is called the
antecedent of this entailment formula and $Y$ is called the consequent. $\square$
We inductively define the degree of an entailment connective.
Definition 4.2 We say the degree of the entailment connective in an
entailment formula $X\Rightarrow Y$ is 1 if both X and $Y$ are classical formulas. We say
the degree of the entailment connective in an entailment formula $X\Rightarrow Y$ is $k+1$
if there exists a positive integer $k$ such that $k$ is the highest degree of
entailment connectives in X and Y. We call a formula a first degree entailment
formula if the highest degree of its entailment connectives is 1. We use $C\gamma$ to
denote the set of all first degree entailment formulas. We call a formula a
second degree entailment formula if the highest degree of its entailment
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connectives is 2. We use $C_{s}$ to denote the set of all second degree entailment
formulas. $\square$
A classical formula is also called a zero degree entailment formula.
In the following discussion, we use $P$ to denote a set of formula $\{Z_{1}, Z_{2}, \cdots, Z_{n}\}$
and use $q$ to denote a single formula.
Definition 4.3 A deduction of $q$ from $P$ is a finite sequence of formulas such
that each member of the sequence is either an axiom, a member of $P$ , or is
obtained by using any of the inference rules from two earlier members of the
sequence, and the last member of the sequence is q. We call all members of P
the premisses and $q$ the consequence of the deduction. A deduction $q$ from the
empty set ofpremisses is called a proofand $q$ is called a formal theorem. $\square$
Definition 4.4 We say $Ps\gamma ntacticall\gamma$ entails $q$ or $q$ is provable from $P$ ,
write $P\vdash q$ , if and only if $q$ satisfies any of the following conditions:
(1) $q$ is an axiom;
(2) $q\in P$ ;
(3) there exist some $r$ and $t$ such that $P\vdash r,$ $P\vdash t$ and $q=r\wedge t$; or
(4) there exists some $t$ such that $P\vdash t$ and $P\vdash(t\Rightarrow q)$ . $\square$
Clearly, $P\vdash q$ if and only if there exists adeduction of $q$ from $P$, and $\Phi\vdash q$ if
and only if $q$ is a formal theorem, where $\Phi$ denotes the empty set.
5. Formal Semantics of Second Degree Propositional Entailment Logic
It is not a conpletely solved problem to provide an adequate formal model for
the entailment logic. We are investigating an algebra semantics for full
propositional entailment logic. Below, we give a formal semantics for a
subclass of the entailment logic, named second degree propositional entailment
logic and denoted by $PEL_{sd}$.
The alphabet $ofPEL_{sd}$ are the same as that of $Cm$. The set of all formulas of
$PEL_{sd}$ is $C_{c}\cup C;\cup C_{s}$ . The axiom schemata of $PEL_{sd}$ are $A_{1}$ , and $A_{4}\sim A_{10}$ of
Cm. The inference rules $ofPEL_{sd}$ are the same as that of Cm.
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First of all, we describe some basic concepts of lattice theory [Birkhoff-61,
Szasz-63, Rutherford-65].
Definition 5.1 A partial order on a set A is a binary relation relation $\leqq\subseteq$
$A\cross A$ satisfying the following conditions:
Reflexivity : For every a in $A,$ $a\leqq a$;
Antisymmety : For every $a,$ $a$’ in $A$, if both $a\leqq a$’ and $a’\leqq$ a hold, then a
$=a’$;
Transitivity : For every $a,$ $a’,$ $a$ ’ in $A$, if both a $\leqq a$ ’ and $a’\leqq a$’ hold,
then $a\leqq a’$ .
If $\leqq$ is a partial order on $A$, we call the pair $(A, \leqq)$ a poset (short for $partiall\gamma$
ordered set). $\square$
Definition 5.2 Let $(A, \leqq)$ be a poset. Let $A$’ be a subset ofA. An element $b$
of A is called an lower bound (1.b.) for $A’$ , if $b\leqq$ a for every a in $A’;b$ is called
greatest lower bound (g.l.$b.$ ) for $A’$ , if $b’\leqq b$ for every l.b. $b$ ’ for $A’$ . An element $b$
of A is called an upper bound (u.p.) for $A$’ if $a\leqq b$ for every a in $A’,$ $b$ is called
least upper bound (l.u.$p.$ ) for $A$’ ifb $\leqq b$’ for every u.b. $b$ ’ for $A’$ . We denote g.l.$b$ .
and l.u. $p$ . for $A’ by\cap A$ ’ and U $A$’ respectively. If $A$’ has only two elements, we
write $a_{1}\cap a_{2}$ (read: $a_{1}$ meet $a_{2}$ ) and $a_{1}Ua_{2}$ (read: $a_{1}$ join $a_{2}$ ), respectively, $for\cap$
$\{a_{1}, a_{2}\}$ and $U\{a_{1}, a_{2}\}$ . $\square$
Definition 5.3 A meet-semilattice is a poset $(L, \leqq)$ such that any two its
elements have a g.l.$b.$ ; a.ioin-semilattice is a poset $(L, \leqq)$ such that any two its
elements have a l.u.$b.$ ; a lattice is a poset $(L, \leqq)$ which is both a meet-
semilattice and ajoin-semilattice; a complete lattice is a poset $(L, \leqq)$ in which
every subset has botha g.1.$b$ . andal.u.b.. $\square$
Now, we define a lattice for giving formal semantics $ofPEL_{sd}$.
Definition 5.4 An entailment lattice is a quadruplet $<L,$ $\leqq,$ $N,$ $T>$ that
satisfies the following conditions:
(1) $(L, \leqq)$ is a meet-semilattice;
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(2) $N$ is a unary function, which satisfies the following conditions, on $L$ :
$<1>for$ all $a\in L,$ $N(N(a))=a$, and
$<2>for$ all $a,$ $b\in L$, if $a\leqq b$ then $N(b)\leqq N(a)$ ;
(3) $T$ is a sublattice, which satisfies the following conditions, of $L$ :
$<1>for$ all a E $L,$ $N(a)$ ( $T$ iffa $\not\in T$ ,
$<2>for$ all $a,$ $b\in L,$ $a\cap b\in T$ iff a $\in T$ and $b\in T$ , and
$<3>there$ exists no $a,$ $b\in L$ such that $a\in T,$ $N(b)\in T$ , and $a\leqq b$ . $\square$
We use $F$ and $T$, called truth values, to represent ”false” and “true”
respectively. Let $D$ be the set of all atomic formulas. Let $C_{c}$ be the set of all
classical formulas defined on $D,$ $C\gamma$ the set of all first degree entailment
formulas defined on $D$ , and $C_{s}$ the set of all second degree entailment formulas
defined on $D$ , respectively.
Definition 5.5 An interpretation $ofPEL_{sd}$ is a quadruplet I $=<L_{e},$ $v_{f},$ $v_{S}$ ,
$s>that$ satisfies the following conditions:
(1) $L_{e}=<L,$ $\leqq,$ $N,$ $T>is$ an entailment lattice;
(2) $v_{f}$ is a mapping, $v_{f}$ : $Darrow L$;
(3) $v_{S}$ is a mapping, $v_{s}$ : { $X\Rightarrow Y$ I X, $Y\in C_{c}$ } $arrow L$, which satisfies the
following conditions:
$<1>v_{S}(X\Rightarrow Y)\in T$ iff $s(X)\leqq s(Y)$ ,
$<2>v_{s}(\neg X\Rightarrow Y)\leqq v_{S}(\neg Y\Rightarrow X)$ ,
$<3>s(X\wedge\neg Y)\leqq N(v_{s}(X\Rightarrow Y))$,
$<4>(v_{s}(X\Rightarrow Y)\cap v_{s}(X\Rightarrow Z))\leqq v_{s}(X\Rightarrow(Y\wedge Z))$,
$<5>ifs(X)\leqq v_{s}(Y\Rightarrow Z)$ then $s(X\wedge Y)\leqq v_{s}(Z)$;
(4) $s$ is a mapping, $s$ : $C_{c}UC$; $arrow L$, which satisfies the following
conditions :
$<1>s(d)=v_{f}1d)$ for all $d\in D$ ,
$<2>s(d)=v_{s}(d)$ for all $d\in$ { $X\Rightarrow Y$ I X, $Y\in C_{c}$ },
$<3>s(\neg X)=N(s(X))$ for all $X\in C_{c}\cup C\gamma$,
$<4>s(X\wedge Y)=s(X)\cap s(Y)$ for all X, $Y\in C_{c}\cup C\gamma$. $\square$
Definition 5.6 For every interpretation I $=<L_{e},$ $v_{f},$ $v_{s},$ $s>$ and every
formula $fofPEL_{sd}$, the truth value of $f$, denoted by I(f), is inductively defined as
follows, where X, $Y\in C_{c}\cup C\gamma\cup C_{s}$ and $M,$ $N\in C_{c}\cup C\gamma$ .
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(1) For every $X\in D,$ $I(X)=Tiffv_{f}(X)\in T$, and otherwise I(X) $=F$.
(2) $I(\neg X)=T$ iffI(X) $=F$, and otherwise $I(\neg X)=F$ .
(3) $I(X\wedge Y)=T$ iffI(X) $=T$ and $I(Y)=T$, and otherwise $I(X\wedge Y)=F$ .
(4) $I(M\Rightarrow N)=Tiffs(M)\leqq s(N)$, and otherwise $I(M\Rightarrow N)=F$. $\square$
In the following discussion, we use $P$ to denote a set of formula $\{Z_{1}, Z_{2}, \cdots, Z_{n}\}$
and use $q$ to denote a single formula.
Defnition 5.7 We say $P$ semantically entails $q$ , write PFq, if and only if
$I((Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\Rightarrow q)=T$ for any interpretation I $=<L_{e},$ $v_{f},$ $v_{s},$ $s>$ . We say a
formula $q$ is valid, write Fq, if and only if I(q) $=T$ for any interpretation I $=$
$<L_{e},$ $v_{f},$ $v_{s},$ $s>$ . $\square$
From this definition, we have the following Theorem 5.1 as a direct result.
Theorem 5.1 $\{X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}\}FY$ iff $F(X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge X_{n})\Rightarrow Y$ . $\square$
Corollary XFY iff $FX\Rightarrow Y$ . $\square$
The following Theorem 5.2 shows that $PEL_{sd}$ has a model defined based on
an entailment lattice.
Theorem 5.2 All axioms $ofPEL_{sd}$ are valid.
Proof This is easy to prove by applying Definition 5.6 to all axiom
schemata $ofPEL_{sd}$. $\square$
The following two theorems shows that the two inference rules of the
propositional entailment logic are valid.
Theorem 5.3 If $P!=X$ and $PFX\Rightarrow Y$ then PFY.
Proof Suppose $P1=X$ and $PFX\Rightarrow Y$ . Then
$I((Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\Rightarrow X)=T$ for any interpretation I, and
$I((Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\Rightarrow(X\Rightarrow Y))=T$ for any interpretation I.
According to Definition 5.5, if $I((Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\Rightarrow(X\Rightarrow Y))=T$ then
$I(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n}\wedge X\Rightarrow Y)=T$. Therefore, for any interpretation I $=<L_{e},$ $v_{f},$ $v_{s}$ ,
$s>$ , the following formulas hold.
$s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\leqq s(X)$ and $s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n}\wedge X)\leqq s(Y)$
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According to Definition 5.5, $s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n}\wedge X)=s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\cap s(X)$ .
Moreover, according to lattice theory, if a $\leqq b$ then a $\cap b=a$ . Therefore, we
have
$s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\leqq s(Y)$
Consequently,
$I((Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\Rightarrow Y)=T$ for any interpretation I, i.e., P $FY$. $\square$
Corollary If EX and $FX\Rightarrow Y$ then $I=Y$ .
Proof Suppose FX and $FX\Rightarrow Y$. Then
I(X) $=T$ for any interpretation I, and
$I(X\Rightarrow Y)=T$ for any interpretation I.
Therefore, for any interpretation I $=<L_{e},$ $v_{f},$ $v_{s},$ $s>$ , the following formulas
hold.
$s(X)\in T$ and $s(X)\leqq s(Y)$
So, according to the properties of entailment lattices (see Definition 5.4), there
must be $s(Y)\in T$ , i.e., $FY$ . $\square$
Theorem 5.4 IfPPX and P#Y then $PFX\wedge Y$ .
Proof Suppose PPX and PEY. Then
$I((Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\Rightarrow X)=T$ for any interpretation I, and
$I((Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\Rightarrow Y)=T$ for any interpretation I.
Therefore, for any interpretation I $=<L_{e},$ $v_{f},$ $v_{s},$ $s>$ , the following formulas
hold.
$s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\leqq s(X)$ and $s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\leqq s(Y)$
So, according to lattice theory, the following formula holds.
$s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\leqq s(X)\cap s(Y)$




$s(Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge Z_{n})\leqq s(X\wedge Y)$.
Consequently,
$I((Z_{1}\wedge Z_{2}\wedge\cdots\Lambda Z_{n})\Rightarrow(X\wedge Y))=T$ for any interpretation I, i.e., PkXAY. $\square$
Corollary If $FX$ and PY then FXAY. $\square$
From Theorems 5.1\sim 5.4, we have the following
$Theorem5.5(TheSoundnessTheoremofPEL_{sd})$ $IfP\vdash qthenPt=q$; if
$\vdash q$ then Eq. $\square$
We may say, similar to the classical mathematical logic, that a formula X
follows from a set $P$ of formulas, write $PF_{f}X$ , if and only if I(X) $=T$ for every
interpretation with $I(Y)=T$ for every Y E P. But, note that in the terms of the
propositional entailment logic, “a formula X follows from a set $P$ of formulas”
does not mean $P$ semantically entails X”.
In the classical mathematical logic, a fundamental fact is $\{X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}\}E_{f}Y$
iff $F_{f}\langle X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge X_{n}$ )$arrow Y$ or $XF_{f}Y$ iff $F_{f}Xarrow Y$ . However, in the propositional
entailment logic, we only have the following Theorem 5.5 but do not have its
converse theorem. This shows one of the differences between the entailment
and the material implication in semantics.
Theorem 5.6 If $\mathfrak{t}=f\langle X_{1}\wedge X_{2}\wedge\cdots\wedge X_{n}$) $\Rightarrow Y$ then $\{X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}\}F_{f}Y$ ; if
$F_{f}X\Rightarrow Y$ then $XF_{f}Y$ . $\square$
6. Valid Deductive Reasoning
In the framework of the classical mathematical logic, from any given
proposition X and the axiom $Xarrow(Yarrow X)$ , we can infer $Yarrow X$ by using the modus
ponens with the material implication. It is clear that the inference is not
necessarily regarded to be valid from the viewpoint of human ordinary logical
thinking because there may be no necessarily relevant relation between $Y$ and
X. Then, what is a ”valid” deductive reasoning? Let us consider the question.
This is an old and important problem both in philosophy and in logical science.
For computer science, when we intend to develop a software system working
with a deductive reasoning mechanism, such as a logic programming system,
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deductive database, expert system, and knowledge-based system, to consider
and answer the above problem is very important for designing the deductive
reasoning mechanism and correctly evaluating conclusions deductively
reasoned by the software system.
Definition 6.1 An entailment formula $X\Rightarrow Y$ is called a valid entailment
formula if $FX\Rightarrow Y$ . A valid entailment formula $X\Rightarrow Y$ is called a derivative
formula if $FX$ can be determined only after PY has been determined, i.e., if not
FY then not $FX$. A valid entailment formula $X\Rightarrow Y$ is called a deductive
formula if EX without deternining $1FY$, i.e., $FX$ whether PY or not. $\square$
The property that $FX$ can be determned without determining FY is called
the second independence [Lin-85a,b].
For exanple, $(X\wedge Y)\Rightarrow Y$ is a derivative formula and $(X\wedge(X\Rightarrow Y))\Rightarrow Y$ is a
deductive formula.
Theorem 6.1 If $X\Rightarrow Y$ is a valid entailment formula, then X and $Y$ must
share a propositional variable.
Proof Suppose $X\Rightarrow Y$ is a valid entailment formula, i.e., $FX\Rightarrow Y$ . If no
propositional variable occurs both in X and in $Y$ , then we can construct an
interpretation I $=<L_{e},$ $v_{f},$ $v_{s},$ $s>$ such that $s(Y)\leqq s(X)$ . But this is
inconsistent with the fact $FX\Rightarrow Y$ . Therefore, X and $Y$ must share a
propositional variable. $\square$
Corollary If $X\Rightarrow Y$ is a valid entailment formula and a first degree
entailment formula, then X and $Y$ must share all propositional variables
occurring in Y. $\square$
Theorem 6.2 No first degree entailment formula is a deductive formula.
Proof Suppose $X\Rightarrow Y$ is a first degree entailment formula, then by the
corollary of Theorem 6.1 X and $Y$ must share all proposition$a1$ variables
occurring in Y. Therefore, if not FY then not $FX$, i.e., $X\Rightarrow Y$ is not a deductive
formula. $\square$
Theorem 6.2 means that ”every tautological implicational formula is a




An interesting fact is that every “logical derivative law” specified in formal
logic texts can be regarded a first degree entailment fornula and every “logical
deductive law” specified in formal logic texts can be regarded a second degree
deductive formula.
In the following discussion, we use the following abbreviations (defined
logical operators).
$\bullet$ $X\vee Y$ : $\neg(\neg X\wedge\neg Y)$
$\bullet$ $Xarrow Y$ : $\neg(X\wedge\neg Y)$
$\bullet$ $Xrightarrow Y$ : $(Xarrow Y)\wedge(Yarrow X)$
$\bullet$ $X$} $Y$ : $\neg X\Rightarrow Y$
$\bullet$ X! $Y$ : $\neg(X\Rightarrow\neg Y)$
$\bullet$ $X\Leftrightarrow Y$ : $(X\Rightarrow Y)\wedge(Y\Rightarrow X)$
For notional simplicity, we may define a priority order of the primitive and
defined logical operators: $\neg$ $\wedge,$ $\vee$ , !, } $,$ $arrow$ $rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow,$ $\Leftrightarrow$ where the priority
order of a left operator is higher that of the right one.
The derivative laws used in our ordinary logical thinking and discussed in
formal logic are given by the notation of entailment logic as follows [Lin-85a].
$\bullet$ $X\Leftrightarrow X$
$\bullet$ $X\wedge X\Leftrightarrow X$
$\bullet$ $X\vee X\Leftrightarrow X$
$\bullet$ $\neg\neg X\Leftrightarrow X$
$\bullet$ $X\wedge Y\Leftrightarrow Y\Lambda X$
$\bullet$ $X\vee Y\Leftrightarrow Y\vee X$
$\bullet$ $(X\wedge Y)\wedge Z\Leftrightarrow X\wedge(Y\wedge Z)$
$\bullet$ $(X\vee Y)\vee Z\Leftrightarrow X\vee(Y\vee Z)$
$\bullet$ $X\wedge(Y\vee Z)\Leftrightarrow(X\wedge Y)\vee(X\wedge Z)$
$\bullet$ $X\vee(Y\wedge Z)\Leftrightarrow(X\vee Y)\wedge(X\vee Z)$
$\bullet$ $\neg(X\wedge Y)\Leftrightarrow\neg X^{\neg}Y$
$\bullet$ $\neg(X\vee Y)\Leftrightarrow\neg X\wedge\neg Y$
$\bullet$ $X\wedge Y\Rightarrow X$
$\bullet$ $X\Rightarrow X\vee Y$
The deductive laws used in our ordinary logical thinking and discussed in
formal logic are given by the notation of entailment logic as follows [Lin-85a].
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$\bullet$ $(X\wedge(X\Rightarrow Y))\Rightarrow Y$
$\bullet$ $(\neg Y\wedge(X\Rightarrow Y))\Rightarrow\neg X$
$\bullet$ $(\neg X\wedge(\neg X\Rightarrow Y))\Rightarrow Y$
$\bullet$ $(X\wedge(\neg X\Rightarrow Y)\wedge(Y\Rightarrow\neg X))\Rightarrow\neg Y$
$\bullet$ $(X\wedge(X\Rightarrow\neg Y))\Rightarrow\neg Y$
$\bullet$ $((X\Rightarrow Z)\wedge(Y\Rightarrow Z)\wedge(X\vee Y))\Rightarrow Z$
$\bullet$ $((X\Rightarrow M)\wedge(Y\Rightarrow N)\wedge(XY))\Rightarrow(M\vee N)$
$\bullet$ $((X\Rightarrow Y)\wedge(X\Rightarrow Z)\wedge(\neg Y^{\neg}Z))\Rightarrow\neg X$
$\bullet$ $((X\Rightarrow M)\wedge(Y\Rightarrow N)\wedge(\neg M^{\neg}N))\Rightarrow(\neg X^{\neg}Y)$
$\bullet$ $(X\Rightarrow Y)\Rightarrow(\neg Y\Rightarrow\neg X)$
$\bullet$ $(X\Rightarrow(Y\wedge\neg Y))\Rightarrow\neg X$
$\bullet$ $(X\Rightarrow\neg X)\Rightarrow\neg X$
$\bullet$ $((X\Rightarrow Y)\wedge(Y\Rightarrow Z))\Rightarrow(X\Rightarrow Z)$
$\bullet$ $((X\Rightarrow M)\wedge(Y\Rightarrow N))\Rightarrow((X\wedge Y)\Rightarrow(M\wedge N))$
$\bullet$ $((X\Rightarrow M)\wedge(Y\Rightarrow N))\Rightarrow((\neg M\wedge\neg N)\Rightarrow(\neg X\wedge\neg Y))$
Note that all above deductive lows are second degree deductive formulas.
This fact means that the second degree entailment formulas are sufficient for
our ordinary logical thinking.
In the framework of the propositional entailment logic, a deductive reasoning
for a formula X from $a$ given set $P$ of formulas, called the premises of the
deductive reasoning, can be regarded as $P\vdash X$ .
Definition 6.2 We say a deductive reasoning is valid if and only if it
satisfies the following two conditions:
(1) the modus ponens “from X and $X\Rightarrow Y$ to infer $Y$’ is applied at least once;
(2) there exists at least one entailment fornula $f\in P$ which is a deductive
formula. $\square$
For example, “by R2 from X, $Y$ to infer XAY” and “by Rl from $X\wedge Y,$ $(X\wedge Y)$
$\Rightarrow Y$ to infer $Y$’ are not valid deductive reasoning. “by Rl from $X\wedge(X\Rightarrow Y)$ ,
$(X\wedge(X\Rightarrow Y))\Rightarrow Y$ to infer $Y$ ’ is a valid deductive reasoning.
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition The conclusion of a valid deductive reasoning is not a




We have presented why it is not suitable to use the material implication as a
logical basis for deductive reasoning and have discussed what is a valid
deductive reasoning based on the entailment notion that is a logical connective
in entailment logic and relevance logics. The discussion leads us to proposes to
use the entailment as a logical basis for deductive reasoning.
Now, let us discuss what contributions to computer science it can make to use
the entailment as a logical basis for deductive reasoning.
First, the entailment notion provides a logical basis for more clearly and
naturally describing if $\cdots$ then”, only $\cdots$ if”, and “if and only if’ in knowledge
representation.
Second, we can reject ambiguous descriptions for some central concepts of
declarative semantics of logic programs, e.g., “logical consequence”, “correct
answer”, and so on [Lloyd-87], and then give more clear and “logical”
descriptions for such concepts using the entailment notion.
Third, using the entailment as a logical basis for deductive reasoning makes
it possible for us to construct such logic systems where the validity of a
conclusion of a deductive reasoning is dependent only on the validity of given
premises and the correctness of the reasoning and independent of the concrete
content of the conclusion. As a result, a logic programming system or deductive
database based on the entailment logic may answer such a query as “is
judgnent if $X$ then $Y$’ correct?”.
Finally, for given premises, i.e., knowledge, a theorem prover based on the
entailment logic can deduce many new entailment formulas as valid conditions
with respect to the entailment relation between two propositions, i.e., inference
rules or new knowledge. This provides a logical basis for automatic synthesis of
program, automatic generation of production rules of a production system,
maintenance of a knowledge-based system.




(1) Can we provide an adequate formal semantics for the full entailment
logic with which we can discuss the soundness and completeness of the
entailment logic?
(2) Is the entailment logic decidable for provability and validity?
(3) What automatic theorem proving method is suitable for the entailment
logic?
Another further work is to compare the entailment logic and the relevance
logics with other non-classical logic systems such as Nute’s “conditional logic”
[Nute-80], McDermott’s Nonmonotonic Logic [McDermott-80,82], and so on.
The proposal to use the entailment as a logical basis for deductive reasoning
is one of the results of our investigation for constructing a suitable logic system
for deductive reasoning based concurrent program debugging [Cheng-88]. We
developed an execution monitor for concurrent Ada programs that can record
the execution history of a monitored program [Cheng-87]. In order to provide a
powerful means for its users to debug a concurrent Ada program, we intend to
develop a deductive reasoning based concurrent program debugging approach
[Cheng-88]. In the approach, debugging a program can be regarded as queries
and updates on a deductive database which contains the program specification,
program source text, execution histories, and knowledge about program errors;
detecting a program error can be regarded as a deductive proof for $a$ formal
theorem which is a logical formula specifying the error.
We are working for extending the entailment logic into a temporal
entailment logic in order to construct a suitable logic system for deductive
reasoning based concurrent program debugging [Cheng-88].
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